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In human-human interactions a consciously perceived high degree of self-other overlap
is associated with a higher degree of integration of the other person’s actions into one’s
own cognitive representations. Here, we report data suggesting that this pattern does
not hold for human-robot interactions. Participants performed a social Simon Task with
a robot, and afterwards indicated the degree of self-other overlap with the help of the
Inclusion of the Other in the Self (IOS) scale. We found no overall correlation between
the social Simon Effect (as an indirect measure of self-other overlap) and the IOS score
(as a direct measure of self-other overlap). For female participants we even observed a
negative correlation. Our findings suggest that conscious and unconscious evaluations of
a robot may come to different results, and hence point to the importance of carefully
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choosing a measure for quantifying the quality of human-robot interactions.
Keywords: human-robot interaction; joint action; social simon effect.
1. Introduction
As robots are becoming more and more integrated in everyday life, recent research
investigated the parameters characterizing interactions between humans and robots.
In these human-robot interaction studies mostly questionnaires have been used to
study different aspects of the interaction quality, including conscious measures of
how robots are perceived (e.g. regarding their animacy and intelligence1 or regarding
the empathy participants feel for a robot2). Besides using questionnaires in human-
robot interaction studies, in the last years some studies used paradigms adapted
from cognitive psychology, like motor interference paradigms3 or motion-capture
technique4, as indirect, behavioral indicators to study reactions towards a robotic
agent. In the present study we applied the social Simon task in a joint action setting
between a human and a robot. The social Simon task is an indirect, non-conscious
behavioral measure commonly used to study to what extent humans co-represent
the actions of other human interaction partners when acting jointly, a phenomenon
referred to as action co-representation. In a broader sense, the social Simon Task
has been interpreted to measure the degree to which people integrate the other
person in the self5 6. For interactions between humans, action co-representation
has been shown to depend on the interpersonal relationship between two humans,
with stronger co-representation effects the closer the relationship. Here, we aimed to
test if the amount of co-representation of robotic actions correlates positively with
the consciously perceived integration of a robotic agent in the self. To investigate
this question, we reanalyzed data from a recent study of our labs7 with respect
to this question, adding new conscious rating measures of self-other integration.
While human participants showed evidence for self-other integration of a robotic
agent in an indirect and unconscious test, evidence for self-other integration as
obtained with a more conscious measurement was, however, weak. Conscious and
unconscious measurements of self other integration may be dissociated from each
other in human-robot interaction.
1.1. The social Simon task
The social Simon task, which was developed by Sebanz et al. in 20038, is a well
established paradigm from cognitive psychology for measuring relatively automatic
joint-action effects. It has been mainly applied to human-human interactions. The
social Simon task is based on the standard Simon task, which was first developed
by Simon and Rudell in 19679. In the standard Simon task one of two stimuli, e.g.
a square or a diamond, is displayed on the left or right side of a monitor. A single
person reacts to both stimuli by pressing one of two buttons, which are located
to the left and right side of the monitor. For example, his or her task is to press
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the left button when a square appears on the screen, and to press the right but-
ton, when a diamond appears. The task relevant information is the shape of the
stimulus. Although the spatial stimulus location is irrelevant for solving the task
correctly response times are usually faster when stimulus location (left or right side
of the screen) and response location (left or right button) correspond compared to
when they do not correspond, as spatially corresponding stimuli facilitate responses,
whereas spatially non-corresponding stimuli interfere with responses10. The differ-
ence in response times between corresponding and non-corresponding trials is called
the Simon effect9 11 12.
In a study of Sebanz et al. (2003)8 two persons sitting side by side in front of a
monitor shared a standard Simon task, so that each person was responsible for only
one part of the task. This means that the left person pressed a button when one of
two possible stimuli appeared on the screen, and the right person pressed a button
when the other stimulus was displayed. When both persons performed their part of
the task together (social Simon task or Joint Go/Nogo Task), a Simon effect was
observed in each of them (social Simon effect, SSE). That is, their responses were
faster, when the stimulus location corresponded with the location of their response
button. No Simon effect was observed when one person performed his or her part of
the task alone (Individual go/nogo task)8 13, although in this Individual condition
the sitting position of the participant and the location of the response button were
the same as in the Joint condition. Even in an Individual condition, in which another
person was passively sitting besides the participant, and not responding to the
other part of the task, no Simon effect was observed8. On the other hand, when
participant’s are aware that another person is performing the other part of the task,
not hearing the sounds of the partner’s key presses or not seeing the partner (after
being blindfolded) is not enough to eliminate the SSE814. Thus, the crucial factor for
the SSE to occur is the active involvement of the other person in the task, whereas
the SSE does not seem to rely on the perception of the action effects produced by the
other person. These observations led Sebanz and colleagues to the conclusion that
the SSE can be interpreted as an index of action co-representation8 15 16. That is,
when acting together each participant automatically seems to integrate the actions
of their partner into his own representation of the task, just as if each of them was
in charge of the partner’s action themselves. Co-representation may also contain
information about whether and when the interaction partner has to respond17 18.
1.2. Co-representation of non-biological agents
Action co-representation was first believed to be restricted to human agents. Evi-
dence for this assumption came from a study of Tsai and Brass (2007)19, in which
participants conducted a social Simon task either with a video showing the hand of
a human agent or of a non-biological, wooden agent. A SSE was only observed when
participants performed the task with the human agent. In another study by Tsai,
Kuo, Hung, and Tzeng (2008)20 participants performed a social Simon task while
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being told to share the task either with a computer or with another human sitting
in another room (not visible to participants). Evidence for action co-representation
was only found for those participants who believed to share the task with another
human. From these findings Tsai and colleagues concluded that humans only co-
represent the actions of other humans, and speculated that this might have evolved
in order to facilitate interactions with conspecifics.
However, recent studies showed that action co-representation can occur for non-
biological agents depending on the degree of humanness attributed to the other
agent. In a study of Mu¨ller and colleagues (2011)21 participants performed a social
Simon task with a wooden hand, but prior to the task, they either watched a short
video sequence about a human actor or a wooden actor behaving in a human-like
way (a sequence from the Walt Disney movie Pinocchio). Only those participants
who had watched the video about the wooden agent, showed evidence for action
co-representation when performing the social Simon task with the wooden hand.
Mu¨ller and colleagues concluded that action co-representation can occur for non-
biological agents when perceiving an agent as animate. Regarding interactions with
real robotic agents, a study from our labs showed that action co-representation
is sensitive to the believed humanness of a robot’s functional principle7. Prior to
performing a social Simon Task together with a robot, participants were either
told that the robot functioned in a human-like, intelligent way (human-like robot
condition), or that it functioned in a machine-like, deterministic way (machine-like
robot condition). Participants were randomly assigned to one of both conditions
with the constraint that both groups were matched regarding gender. Participants
who performed a social Simon task with the robot which they believed to function
similar to a human, showed evidence for action co-representation. In contrast, those
participants who were told that the robot functioned in a machine-like way did not
co-represent the robot’s actions. These studies suggest that higher order cognitive
processes, like the belief about an agent’s animacy or its functional principle, affect
the amount of action co-representation in a top-down manner.
1.3. Which aspects of the interpersonal relationship between two
humans affect action co-representation?
For human-human interaction it has been shown that the amount of action co-
representation is sensitive to the interpersonal relationship between two inter-
acting individuals. For example, Hommel, Colzato, and van Wildenberg (2009)22
found that action co-representation is stronger when both interaction partners were
in a positive relationship. In their study, only participants who co-acted with a
friendly, supporting co-actor, co-represented their partner’s action, whereas partic-
ipants who performed the task with an unfriendly, intimidating co-actor did not.
In line with these results, Iani and colleagues (2011)23 found evidence for action
co-representation only when both participants cooperated in the social Simon task
trying to achieve a common goal (the best performing couple received reward) but
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not when participants competed in the task (best performing participant received
reward). Recent findings from Colzato et al. (2012)5 suggest that the consciously
perceived closeness towards others also determines to which extend his or her actions
are co-represented. In their study, practicing buddhist, who learn by their religious
practice to remove the barriers between themselves and others, showed stronger ac-
tion co-representation effects than a matched control group of atheist. Colzato et al.
concluded that the higher closeness buddhist feel towards their fellow beings results
in a stronger integration of the other person in the self including the integration of
the other persons actions. In summary, it can be stated that in human-human inter-
actions the shared representational system is sensitive to the consciously perceived
interpersonal relationship between two co-acting human individuals, with stronger
co-representation effects for more closely perceived relationships.
But what about interactions between humans and robots? Does the consciously
perceived self-other integration with a robot go hand in hand with a more indirectly
and automatically measured co-representation of robotic actions? This question is
highly important, because the major amount of research on human-robot interaction
currently uses conscious questionnaire measurements. Humans do not only attach
to other humans, but also to objects of great personal importance to them. This is
not only true for children, who often attach emotionally to dolls or other toys24 25
but also for adults who are often emotionally attached to pieces of art or personal
memorabilia26. Further, there seem to exist gender-specific differences regarding the
type of objects that are attached to: For example, men more often name technical
devices as an object of attachment than women27.
1.4. Purpose of the present study
In the present study we investigated whether co-representation of robotic actions
(as a unconscious measure of self-other integration) is positively correlated with
the perceived closeness felt towards a robot (a conscious measure of self-other inte-
gration). Participants performed a social Simon task together with a robot. After
the task participants had to indicate the perceived closeness they felt toward the
robot with the help of the Inclusion of the Other in the Self Scale (IOS scale)28 29,
a measure taken from social psychology used to indicate the closeness and attrac-
tion in an interpersonal relationship between humans. The SSE was calculated by
subtracting averaged response times (RTs) in spatially corresponding trials from
averaged RTs in spatially non-corresponding trials. The size of the SSE, taken as
an index of action co-representation, and the IOS-score were correlated first for the
entire group of participants and second separately for male and female participants.
Given the finding of Colzato et al.5 from human-human interaction research, we ex-
pected an overall positive correlation between conscious and unconscious measures
of self-other integration. We also tested whether there exist gender-specific differ-
ences in the correlation. If men more easily attach emotionally to technical devices
than women, one may expect such gender-specific differences regarding conscious
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and unconscious measures of self-other integration in human-robot interaction.
2. Method
The results of the correlation analyses between concious and unconcious measure-
ments of self-other integration are the result of a new analyses of the data partially
described in the study by Stenzel et al.7.
2.1. Participants
Our sample comprised 48 students from the University Jaume I (Castellon, Spain),
among them were 24 female (mean age = 20.4 years, range = 18 to 38 years) and 24
male (mean age = 19.9 years, range = 18 to 24 years) participants. All participants
were treated according to the ethical guidelines laid down in the 1975 Declaration
of Helsinki. Each participant received 10 Euro for participation.
2.2. Robot
The robot Tombatossals which was devised and assembled in the robotic intelligence
laboratory at the University of Castellon served as the partner in a social Simon task
(Figure 1a). Tombatossals is a humanoid torso with a pan/tilt/vergence anthro-
pomorphic head, eyes-cameras, arms, and a three-finger, four-degrees-of-freedom
Barrett Hand (left hand)30.
A B
Fig. 1. Experimental setup used in the experiment. Participants performed a social Simon task
together with a humanoid torso (see left panel, A). In a social Simon task a standard Simon task is
distributed across two participants. In our study we used a square and a diamond as stimuli which
were presented on the left or right side of the monitor. The participant reacted to the square and
the robot reacted to the diamond by pressing a keyboard button (see right panel, B).
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2.3. Apparatus, Stimuli and Procedure
The experimental program ran on a MacBook Pro. We used a white square and a
diamond (1.9◦ x 1.9◦ of visual angle) as stimuli which were displayed on a 16-in.
CRT monitor with a viewing distance of about 60 cm. As response button we used
the left command key of two apple keyboards which were placed on a table next to
each other (Figure 1b). At the beginning of each trial a white fixation point (0.4◦
x 0.4◦ of visual angle) was presented on a black screen for 250 ms. During the next
250 ms either the square or the diamond appeared 8.0◦ to either the left or right
of the fixation point. Participants could give their response during the next 1800
ms. Afterwards, a visual feedback (duration: 300 ms) informed them whether their
response was correct or not: The fixation dot turned green after correct responses,
and red after errors. Errors could either be misses (not pressing the button although
the imperative stimulus was displayed) or false alarms (pressing the button although
the imperative stimulus was not displayed). The next trial started after a constant
inter-trial interval of 1850 ms. Both stimulus types (square and diamond) were
presented with equal probability (in 50% of trials on the left side, in the other
50% on the right side). The order of trials was pseudo randomized. All participants
performed four blocks comprising 128 trials (512 trials in total). Between blocks
they had a short break.
The participant always sat on the left side of the monitor (Figure 1b) and re-
sponded to the square by pressing the left response button with his or her right index
finger. Participants were asked to respond as fast and as accurately as possible. The
robot was located on the right side of the monitor (Figure 1b) and responded to
the diamond by pressing the right response button with the rightmost finger of its
left hand. When it was the robot’s turn the two joints of the finger moved down
simultaneously to press the button while the rest of the hand was kept completely
still throughout the whole experiment. To make the robot’s response times compa-
rable to a human interaction partner, the robot was controlled by the experimenter
who was sitting behind a panel. The experimenter wore headphones and heard a
tone, every time the robot should give a response. When hearing the tone, the ex-
perimenter pressed a button to send a trigger signal to the robot, which initiated
the finger movement. The robot’s reaction times were comparable to a human in-
teraction partner (mean reaction time: 371 ms). Further, in each block two out of
128 trials (1.6% of trials) were error trials, so that the robot also made some errors,
just like a typical human partner.
Although the robot actually functioned in a deterministic manner as it was
controlled by an external person, we intended to make participants believe that the
robot functions in a human-like way. Therefore, at the beginning of the experiment
we provided participants with information about the robot portraying it either as
an active and intelligent agent or a more passive agent (for details of the instruction
see7).
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Participant
2 3
4 5 6
Robot Participant ParticipantRobot Robot
Participant Robot Participant Robot Participant Robot
Fig. 2. Inclusion of the Other in the Self (IOS) scale. The IOS scale is a measure commonly used
in social psychology to assess the emotional closeness and attraction in an interpersonal relation-
ship. Participants were asked to indicate which of the six images best described the relationship
between themselves and the robot. To illustrate the concept of the scale we added the expressions
”Participant” and ”Robot” to this image. In the scale used in our experiment these labels were
not included.
2.4. Inclusion of the Other in the Self scale
To measure the consciously perceived closeness of the relationship between the par-
ticipant and the robot, we used a modified version of the Inclusion of the Other
in the Self Scale (IOS scale) developed by Aron and colleagues28 29, which partici-
pants filled out after they had performed the social Simon task with the robot. The
IOS scale was developed as a conscious measure of perceived closeness in intimate
relationships, but it was also shown to reflect the perceived emotional closeness
and attraction of a relationship created in a laboratory situation. Participants usu-
ally interpret this scale as a measure of the interconnectedness between themselves
and another person29. In the IOS scale Aron and colleagues incorporated the idea
of perceived closeness as overlapping selves. The IOS scale we used consisted of
six pictures depicting different degrees of overlap of two circles ranging from com-
pletely separated (IOS score: 1) to strongly overlapped (IOS score: 6) (see Figure 2).
A higher IOS score indicated higher perceived closeness to the robot. Participants
were asked to choose the picture which best described the relationship between
themselves and the robot. We did not provide participants with any further infor-
mation about how to interpret the IOS scale. We expected, that the IOS scale would
most likely be interpreted as indicating the attraction or fascination participants
felt for the robot.
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3. Results
We first discarded all trials from the analysis in which the participant or the robot
made an error. The participant’s response on diamond trials was classified as an
error (error type false alarm). As we were only interested in participant’s RTs to the
square, we therefore excluded these trials. Furthermore, as only the first response
time in a trial was recorded, trials in which the robot reacted to the square (error
type ”false alarm” for the robot) were also excluded. One male participant had to
be excluded from the analyses because he did not fill out the IOS scale.
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Fig. 3. Correlations between the size of the SSE and the IOS score plotted separately for female (left
panel, A) and male (right panel, B) participants. r: Pearson’s correlation coefficient, p: significance
value.
For each participant we calculated median RTs for trials with correspondence
and trials with non-correspondence between stimulus location and location of the
response effector. The size of the SSE was calculated by subtracting RTs in corre-
sponding trials from RTs in non-corresponding trials. We first investigated whether
the SSEs for the whole group and for men and women separately were significantly
different from zero, and investigated whether there exist gender differences in the
mean values of the SSE and IOS by calculating two-sided t-tests. Further, we cal-
culated correlations (Pearson’s r) between the size of the SSE and the IOS score
for all participants and separately for male and female participants. The size of the
correlation and the two-tailed p-values are reported.
For the whole group, we observed a significant SSE (5 ms, t(46) = 3.4, p = .002)
reflecting an unconscious effect of self-other integration. This effect was present in
both male (6 ms, t(22) = 2.56, p = .02) and female (4 ms, t(23) = 2.14, p = .04)
participants. There were no significant gender differences regarding the mean SSE,
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t(45) = .79, p = .43, nor did we find gender differences regarding the mean IOS score
(mean male = 3.0, mean female = 3.2, t(45) = −.73, p = .47). The overall mean
IOS score of 3.1 corresponded to the picture of two circles which were arranged very
close to each other, but did not overlap.
For the whole group, we found no significant correlation between the SSE and
the IOS score, r = −.22, p = .14. Numerically we found a small trend for a negative
correlation. For male participants this correlation was non-significant, r = .14, p
= .53. For female participants we observed a significant negative correlation between
the size of the SSE and the IOS score, r = −.55, p = .005, indicating that the
larger the SSE, the less did female participants consciously perceive the robot to
be integrated in the self. The size of the correlation coefficient was significantly
different between male and female participants, z = 2.43, p = .015.
4. Discussion
The majority of research on human-robot interaction used conscious questionnaire
measurements to investigate how robots are perceived regarding characteristics such
as animacy or intelligence1. More recently, indirect and unconscious behavioral in-
dicators were used for measuring the quality of human-robot interactions3 4. In the
present study, we investigated the relationship between an indirect, unconscious
measurement of self-other integration (the SSE8 15) and a conscious measure of
self-other integration (the IOS scale28 29). We further investigated whether there
exist gender specific differences regarding this correlation. Based on human-human
interaction studies5 we expected to find a positive correlation between both mea-
sures. Over all participants, as well as for the group of male and the group of female
participants, we found a significant SSE, i.e. evidence that participants integrated
the robot’s actions in their own task representation at an unconscious level. When
consciously asked to rate self-other integration, both male and female participant’s
mean scores showed no evidence for the inclusion of the robot in the self. Fur-
ther, we did not observe the predicted correlation between the unconscious and
conscious measurements of self-other integration. While male participants showed
absolutely no correlation, the correlation between SSE and IOS was even reversed
for female participants. This pattern seems to be different from what is observed for
human-human interaction studies showing a positive association between the SSE
and the conscious perception of integrating others in the self5. Our findings seem
to reveal a dissociation of unconscious and conscious measurements of self-other
integration for human-robot interactions. While participants integrate the robotic
agent in the self at an unconscious level, they do not report feelings of perceived
closeness towards the robot at a more conscious level. These findings seem highly
relevant for the technical and engineering side of robotics. When developing new
robotic architectures, the only way to adequately test them may be to adopt in-
direct, more unconscious measures. Using explicit questionnaires may or may not
reveal advances of the robotic system. The problem with explicit questionnaires may
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be due to introspection of human participants. Humans often do not have conscious
access of the actually internally ongoing mechanisms. Even when they start to in-
tegrate the robotic agent in the self on an unconscious level, an explicit question
on self-other integration may lead to an active inhibition of conscious self-other
integration. In our study, this was particularly true for female participants: The
larger their unconscious integration of the robotic agent was, the less did female
participants consciously perceive the robot to be integrated in the self.
This points to the role of behavioral measures adopted from human-human
interactions for measuring the interaction quality of human-robot interactions. It
seems to be important that the measures used to index attitudes or emotional
reactions towards a robot are given in a non-conscious way. Self-report measures
might not always be the appropriate way to indicate attitudes towards a robot.
Another interesting finding concerns the lack of a difference in the overall mean
IOS score between male and female participants. This finding is not in line with
the fact that men more easily attach to technical devices than women27. However,
our findings may suggest gender-specific differences with respect to the conscious
evaluation of self-other integration of a robotic interaction partner.
An interesting aspect for future research might be to more directly test gender-
specific differences of different levels of self-other integration between human-human
and human-robot setups. Furthermore, future research should investigate whether
the negative correlation pattern we observed for female participants may be reversed
when choosing a robot as interaction partner that can be more easily emotionally at-
tached to. A stronger emotional attachment might make it easier to consciously per-
ceive a deeper form of emotional closeness felt for the robot. This may be achieved
by making the robot more human-like, for example regarding its physical appear-
ance (e.g. a robot with more human-like facial features) or its behavior (e.g. a robot
with human-like communication skills).
5. Conclusions
The present study shows no overall correlation between unconscious and conscious
measurements of self-other integration for human-robot interactions. While human
participants seem to be open to integrate other human interaction partners in the
self on a conscious and an unconscious level, they start to actively inhibit self-other
integration for robotic partners when consciously asked, although they are open to
unconscious integration. Our findings indicate that conscious and unconscious eval-
uations of a robotic agent might lead to different results, pointing to the importance
of carefully choosing a measure for evaluating human-robot interactions.
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